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Resume
In this paper we discuss the ethical implications of systematic identification and mandatory morally 
enhancing treatment of minors with psychopathy. We outline a scope of the group of minors as well 
as provide a clarification of what is meant by morally enhancing treatment. We then address two 
common arguments against state intervention, first the objection against surveillance and secondly 
the objection that the diagnosing of mental illness of children is in itself problematic. The paper 
goes on to discuss challenges to mandatory pre-crime state interventions based on the uncertainty of
neuropredictions, the diminishing of individual worth, ‘the right to be presumed harmless’, and the 
potential infringement of parental autonomy. In the end we conclude that mandatory treatment of 
minors with conduct disorder and limited prosocial emotions is morally permissible.
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Introduction
Violent crimes are committed every year. Some amount of them are committed by individuals 
suffering from antisocial disorders such as psychopaths. This group is responsible for a 
disproportionately high amount of the collective violent crimes. About 1% of the male population is
psychopaths but they make up 16% of the male prison, parole, and probation population. 
Approximately 93% of them have been in contact with the criminal justice system and are either in 
prison, on parole or probation. They have a high rate of recidivism, on average three times higher 
than a nonpsychopath and on average they have four convictions of violent crimes before the age of
40 (Maibom, 2015: 10). Coupled with their high rate of instrumental violence they propose a 
serious threat to the well-being of innocent people. Because of this, an endeavor to reduce the 
amount of psychopaths in society is a worthwhile pursuit.
   It is the current consensus and understanding that antisocial personality disorders such as 
psychopathy are avoidable if we intervene early in an individual’s life due to the plasticity of the 
brain in young children (Walsh, 2013: 51). In more than a decade there has been a surge in the 
amount of research and books on the topic of human and moral enhancement through 
neurotechnological means, and the challenges that comes with it on topics such as moral 
responsibility, freedom of thought, and its possible role in the criminal justice system from both 
neuroscientists and philosophers (Vedder & Klaming, 2010; Gazzaniga, 2005; Bublitz, 2014 & 
2016). With the goal of reducing the amount of future psychopaths in society we would like to 
suggest a systematic state intervention. In order to exemplify what such an intervention might look 
like, we have outlined an example:
As part of their education kindergarten and school teachers should be trained in recognizing 
behavior that is consistent with the DSM-5 criteria for conduct disorder. The concept of epigenetics 
suggests that environmental factors play a key role in the expression of genes (Walsh, 2013: 44). 
Because of this, we suggest that teachers should arrange meetings with parents in order to discuss 
the child’s behavior and the environment in which it grows up. This information would be 
registered in a database that follows the child through the educational system, enabling different 
schools and teachers to recognize a potential pattern. If the behavior consistent with the DSM-5 
criteria for conduct disorder persists, we advocate that the child should be subject to bioprediction 
looking for genes such as the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) that increases risk of antisocial 
behavior in children who experiences severe maltreatment, tests that focus in the child’s fear 
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conditioning, brain imagining focusing on the development of the child’s amygdala and anterior 
cingulate, and other biopredictive methods that we might develop in the future (Glenn et al., 2015: 
1692ff). Through the use of talk therapy and family counseling focusing on changing behavioral 
patterns in the child as well as in the family, we should seek to change the environmental factors 
that increase the risk of becoming antisocial in adulthood. If behavior consistent with the DSM-5 
criteria for conduct disorder persists into adolescence, and biopredictions show that risk factors such
as increased testosterone levels at ages 10-12, predictive of violent behavior and drug use later in 
adolescence (Ibid: 1693), are present we should intensify our efforts and consider introducing 
effective psychopharmaca as a supplement to therapy. If the behavior persists into late adolescence 
and psychopathic traits have taken root, and if safe and effective morally enhancing 
neurotechnological treatments are available, we propose that these treatments should be coercively 
used as a last resort. Because of the aforementioned highly negative consequences of antisocial 
disorders such as psychopathy, which include both the harm to future victims as well as the harm to 
the individual with the disorder, we argue that the above mentioned intervention should be 
mandatory.
In this paper we are going to (1) address some common arguments against this type of 
intervention, and (2) argue that there are good moral reasons in favor of introducing 
mandatory interventions. 
In order to do this, we will start out by outlining a scope of what we are referring to when we talk 
about psychopaths. We do this in order to avoid potential misunderstandings as recent popular 
culture on psychopaths to some degree has made the term blurred. We then go on to clarify what is 
meant when we refer to moral enhancement of psychopaths. From there we move on to two 
common arguments against state intervention, first the objection against surveillance and the 
infringement on privacy that might follow from it, secondly the objection that diagnosing in and of 
itself causes harm. We then continue by discussing challenges to mandatory pre-crime state 
interventions based on the uncertainty of neuropredictions, the diminishing of individual worth as 
well as ‘the right to be presumed harmless’. Before ending with a discussion on autonomy, we argue
that there is at least one strong paternalistic argument in favor of mandatory treatment.
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Scope
In the following we define what exactly we refer to when talking about psychopathy. 'Psychopath' is
a term that is thrown around rather loosely these days. Psychopaths are fascinating and a great 
number of popular pseudo-scientific books have been published on the subject claiming for instance
that psychopaths are everywhere and that most leaders show psychopathic traits e.g. “Hverdagens 
Psykopater” by Henrik Day Poulsen, and all of a sudden everyone realizes that their boss and the 
guy from accounting they don't like are clear-cut psychopaths. However, when suggesting coercive 
or semi-coercive treatment of minors with the condition, it is imperative that the scope be very clear
and quite narrow to avoid over diagnosing. We are not speaking of children with some psychopathic
traits with a little less than average empathy or who are sometimes inconsiderate. We are interested 
in a narrow group who meet specific criteria and who are likely to become dangerous later on in 
their lives.
   One of the major indicators that teachers and parents should be looking out for is of course 
antisocial behavior, that is to say lack of empathy and behavior that violates major social norms 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013: 319). But antisocial behavior is not a strong enough indicator, since most 
people act antisocially sometimes to some extend. It is a graduated scale and some children may 
meet some criteria without suffering from psychopathy – or any diagnosable condition for that 
matter. Hardly any children – or adults – act empathetically all the time, and even if they act 
antisocially to an extend that could be diagnosed, that does not necessarily mean they fit the profile 
we are interested in. Some children suffer from so called oppositional defiant disorder, which will 
cause them to break social norms repeatedly. They are described as: “chronically angry and 
irritable; are argumentative and defiant, refusing to comply with adult requests; and are vindictive 
toward others, often blaming them for their own mistakes and bad behavior” (Ibid). These children 
– troublesome as they may be – are not the ones we are interested in. Rather we would look at the 
group of children that suffer from conduct disorder. Children with conduct disorder are described as
being more antisocial than those with oppositional defiant disorder and their behavior are 
categorized as follows: “(1) aggression to people and animals, (2) destruction of property, (3) 
deceitfulness or theft, and (4) serious violations of rules” (Ibid: 321).
   An estimated 3 to 7 percent of children and adolescents suffer from conduct disorder, and these 
children are highly likely to exhibit violent and criminal behavior (Ibid). A further distinction is 
made depending on the age of the children at the time of the onset of the conduct disorder. 
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Psychologists distinguish between childhood-onset conduct disorder, if the child is under 10 years 
old, and adolescent-onset conduct disorder, if the child is over ten years old. Children with 
childhood-onset conduct disorder tend to get worse as they grow older (Ibid), and are thus more 
likely to merit coercive moral enhancement. However, not all children with conduct disorder fit our 
criteria since the degree of the condition can vary greatly. It is measured through the DSM-5 
Criteria for Conduct Disorder. For children who meet all the criteria on the DSM-5 Criteria for 
Conduct Disorder another specifier can be applied to determine if they have limited prosocial 
emotions. The qualifying traits are as follows: “(a) lack of remorse or guilt for their actions, (b) 
lack of empathy for others (callousness), (c) lack of concern about performance at school, at work, 
or in other important activities, and (d) shallow deficient emotions (e.g., insincerity in emotions, 
using emotions to manipulate others)” (Ibid: 322). Children or adolescents who meet all of the 
criteria of the DSM-5 Criteria for Conduct Disorder and in addition to that display two or more of 
the above mentioned traits is what characterizes a person with psychopathy (Ibid).
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Defining Moral Enhancement of Psychopaths
The psychopath’s deficient morality is now understood to be largely influenced by the lack of his 
ability to experience fear, and as a result his absent response to the threat of punishment, and his 
lack of guilt and remorse (Maibom, 2014: 34; Marsh, 2014: 140, 148f). Because of the pragmatic 
nature of our goal, to reduce the amount of people suffering from an antisocial disorder such as 
psychopathy and as a result lower the number of potential future victims, our criteria for a 
successful moral enhancement is met if the moral conduct from the psychopath increases from a 
below average moral limit to an average one (Kragh & Ellegaard, 2015: 3f). A precondition for a 
successful moral enhancement would be that a new bioprediction of the individual shows no 
increased risk of violent and antisocial behavior.
   Such an enhancement could come about in different ways. As long as the treatment is safe, with 
no severe side-effects, and effective, we do not differentiate between the use of psychopharmaca, 
invasive or non-invasive treatments nor direct or indirect enhancements. For a discussion on the 
moral status of these subjects see Focquaert, 2014; Kragh & Ellegaard, 2015; Focquaert & 
Schermer, 2015.
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Surveillance and Privacy
In this chapter we will discuss the surveillance that will be necessary in order to identify potential 
psychopaths among children and adolescents. We will outline some of the common objections 
against surveillance in general and argue why we consider that surveillance is in this case justified. 
Skepticism towards surveillance
Suggestions involving more surveillance tends to provoke a bit of skepticism in certain circles. In 
order to detect possible psychopathy in children and adolescents, however, a certain level of 
surveillance will be necessary, and some people will intuitively object to the idea of monitoring 
young kids in order gather information about them without their consent or that of their parents. We 
do consider such skepticism to be reasonable. Throughout the twentieth century non-benevolent 
governments have tried to control their citizens through surveillance time and time again. As early 
as 1948, George Orwell voiced the fear of a surveillance-state in his novel 1984, in which he coined
phrases like Big Brother and Thought Police. Soviet Russia, East Germany during the Cold War, or 
modern day China for that matter are examples of why this skepticism towards surveillance is not 
just based on imaginary conceptions of threat level. Furthermore, the discussion about surveillance 
has not become any less relevant after the end of the Cold War. The rise of global terrorism has 
sparked the discussion, and on top of that the potential for big cyber-companies like Facebook or 
Google to gather information about their users have given a whole new perspective on the issue of 
protecting one’s privacy. A few of the most common objections have been articulated by professor 
Simon Chesterman in his article Privacy and Surveillance in the Age of Terror:
“It also increases the possibility of abuse: the loss or misuse of data, especially the 
discriminatory treatment of particular groups. More generally, however, the very fact of 
government knowledge, or indeed the possibility of such knowledge, may impact on 
individuals and society in deleterious ways. The manner in which governments use 
information to produce self-policing subjects has long been a subject of postmodern social 
theorists” (Chesterman, 2010: 34).
As already mentioned we do consider such skepticism towards surveillance very reasonable, and 
referring solely to the benevolent nature of our suggestions in order to justify them would probably 
not convince many people, since surveillance-states almost always claim to monitor the citizens ‘for
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their own sake’. We do however believe that surveillance can still be justified based on two reasons.
One being the fact that there seem to be a relevant difference when it comes to children and adults 
regarding surveillance, since surveillance already forms part teaching and parenting. The other 
being the potential benefits surveillance and early discovery of psychopathy could lead to on an 
individual as well as a societal level, as age is a relevant factor in the effectiveness of treatment due 
to the higher level of plasticity in children’s brains (Walsh, 2013: 51). An early discovery of 
psychopathy and an early start to the treatment would thus increase the child’s chance of a normal 
life without legal trouble as well as saving potential future victims of violent crimes. 
Current practices in teaching and parenting
Monitoring kids is nothing new – we already do it to quite a large extent. Parents monitor their own 
children and ideally correct them if their conduct fail to live up to the standards of social 
acceptability, and hardly anyone would regard this kind of surveillance as an infringement of the 
child's privacy. In fact most people consider this to be an essential part of good parenting. When 
parents fail to observe and correct their children it is generally frowned upon and considered neglect
– and studies have actually shown that children of neglecting parents are more likely to develop 
conduct disorder (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013: 325). As it is kindergarten and school teachers also 
monitor the children in their care. Part of a schoolteacher’s job is to evaluate the children and 
inform their parents of their general performance in school, including their social skills and ability 
to interact with the other children. If a kindergarten or school teacher detect antisocial behavior in a 
child, they will – besides from trying to correct the child – make a mental note of it, it will form part
of their evaluation of the child and they will be extra vigilant to see if the behavior continues. The 
design of classrooms even reflect this. In a standard classroom the teacher stands in front of the 
pupils who are all facing the teacher. This is of course partly in order for them to be able to see and 
hear the teacher, but this could have been achieved a number of other ways. The traditional 
furnishing of a classroom also enables the teacher to view all the students at the same time 
(Foucault, 1975: 163). A rather high level of vigilance is expected from a normal school teacher, as 
she must detect all kinds of conduct among the children. Not only bullying but also the general 
social dynamics in the class. Both kindergarten and school teachers are also required to report it to 
the authorities if they suspects that a child's parents are abusive or negligent (Trier et al., 2007;  
BUPL, 2013). This kind of surveillance is generally accepted, and we merely suggest a more 
systematic approach when it comes to identifying and responding to children with for instance 
childhood-onset conduct disorder. We would suggest that kindergarten and school teachers receive 
some training in detecting the traits of conduct disorder and limited prosocial emotions and learned 
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how to distinguish that type of conduct from normal aggressive or egocentric behavior in children, 
in order to be able to refer them to a trained psychologist. We have not been able to find any 
reference to the DSM-5 nor any other diagnosing system relevant to the detection of antisocial 
behavior in the curriculum of kindergarten and school teachers. This absence combined with the 
fact that the diagnosing of children in general tends to be a controversial topic - which we will 
discuss in depth in a following chapter - has led us to believe, that educational professionals 
currently do not receive sufficient training on this subject.
Coercive Paternalism and Consequentialism
Besides from the fact that the type of surveillance necessary to detect psychopathy at an early stage 
differ only slightly from the current practice among educational professionals, we also believe there
would be benefits to a systematic and stringent attempt to identify and help psychopaths at an early 
age. As we will discuss in depth later on, there is a clear paternalistic as well as a more traditional 
consequentialist argument for the suggestions we have. We believe that both viewpoints offer 
convincing arguments for the surveillance. However, the paternalistic argument will seem a priori 
unconvincing to the anti paternalist. A common objection to the general idea of coercive 
paternalism is that it is degrading and condescending, since it treats adults ‘as if they were children’.
This will supposedly make the subjects of paternalistic coercion less self dependent and render them
unable to make decisions for themselves (Conley, 2013: 66 and Feinberg, 1986: 24). The subject 
matter of this paper is not to defend paternalism against such claims nor to convince anti 
paternalists. It is, however, worth noting that the subjects in this case actually are children, and 
treating children as children might after all feel less controversial even to the anti paternalist. 
However, as we suggest that the parental decisions of certain parents might still get overruled, 
mandatory treatment would still qualify as paternalistic. The paternalist argument could be 
articulated as follows:
P1: Psychopaths are likely to encounter troubles both with the law and with society in 
general.
P2: We ought to protect people from getting in trouble with the law. 
P3: By identifying psychopaths at a young age it we are more likely treat their condition 
effectively.
C: We should identify and treat psychopaths at a young age in order to protect them from 
getting in trouble with the law. 
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A very similar non-paternalistic consequentialist argument could be put forward as well:
P1: Psychopaths are likely to commit violent crimes resulting in serious harm to the victims.
P2: We ought to protect people from violent crimes resulting in serious harm.
P3: By identifying psychopaths at a young age we are more likely to treat their condition 
effectively.
C: We should identify and treat psychopaths at a young age in order to protect people from 
violent crimes resulting in serious harm.
Though we are not trying to trivialize the potential dangers of surveillance we do believe that the 
fact that an almost identical type of surveillance is already taking place, along with the potential 
benefits of identifying psychopaths as early as possible are strong enough arguments to warrant 
surveillance of this kind.
   In this chapter we have discussed some common objections to surveillance and argued that while 
such objections may in many cases be justified, they are less relevant when the object of the 
surveillance are children. First of all, since the current practices in both parenting and teaching 
already involve a great deal of surveillance, which means that our suggestions would for all intents 
and purposes merely be a more systematic approach to an ongoing practice. Secondly we argue that,
because there are great benefits to identifying potential psychopaths at an early stage, as that would 
increase the odds of treating their condition effectively, there are good moral reasons in favor of 
identifying psychopaths as early as possible.
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Diagnosing
Since the dawn of the anti psychiatry movement in the 1960’s there has been some amount of 
skepticism towards the diagnosing of mental illness in general and towards the diagnosing of 
children with mental illness in particular. In the following we will address three of the most 
common criticisms and attempt to demonstrate why they are not relevant in the case of children 
with psychopathy. First we will discuss the objection regarding the diagnosis becoming a self-
fulfilling prophecy, secondly the claim that behavior that is normally diagnosed is in fact an 
adaptive strategy to a problem in the surroundings, and thirdly the objection that diagnosing mental 
illness is society’s way of pathologizing undesirable behavior. The problem of stigmatization – 
though often brought up in discussions about the diagnosing of mental illness – will not be treated 
here but rather in the later chapter about the moral responsibility to potential future victims.
Self-fulfilling prophecy
One of the more typical judgments regarding the diagnosing of mental illness is the claim that the 
diagnosis will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is especially common when discussing the 
diagnosing of children. The objection is based on the assumption that since children are generally 
more impressionable than adults, a diagnosis will influence the way the adults treat the child, 
thereby reinforcing the child’s feeling of not being normal. Child psychiatrist, Søren Hertz, 
articulates this view in a featured article from 2012:
”Vi skal ikke have urealistiske forventninger, men risikoen er igen, at børnene spejler sig i 
vores tro på begrænsede muligheder, at vi møder dem på en begrænsende måde. Jo mere 
andre er i tvivl om børnenes muligheder, jo mere i tvivl bliver de selv. Og jo mere afhængige 
bliver de af særlige hjælpeforanstaltninger. Diagnosekulturen skaber dermed nemt 
selvopfyldende profetier.” (Berlingske, 16.01.2012, page 25)
In the article he speaks about diagnosing in general, while mostly referring to children diagnosed 
with ADHD in his examples. It is, however, problematic to treat all diagnoses as being equal. It is 
very possible that some teachers and psychologists may be too eager to attach certain diagnoses to 
children behaving in a certain problematic way in order to ‘explain’ their behavior. However, as we 
have discussed in the chapter on our scope, psychopathy is a diagnosis that requires rather specific 
traits and symptoms and should obviously not be easily attached to a child. In the cases where such 
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traits and symptoms are displayed, however, it seems quite unreasonable to refrain from diagnosing 
due to fear of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. One should keep in mind that in order for the 
diagnosis psychopath to be justified, all of the traits from the DSM-5 on conduct disorder must be 
present along with limited prosocial emotions. If a child is violent and threatening, lacking empathy,
deceitful, and takes pleasure in killing or torturing animals it would seem quite a stretch to blame a 
subsequent diagnosis for the child’s moral shortcomings.
Adaptive strategy
Some critics of the diagnosing of children claim that the child’s behavior is an adaptive strategy to 
cope with something exterior. This objection somewhat echoes the famous quote that “insanity is a 
perfectly rational response to an insane world”. The quote has been ascribed to R.D. Laing, one of 
the founding fathers of the anti psychiatry movement, and though it is unclear if it is a paraphrase it 
has gained some reverberation in different groups including those promoting alternative treatments 
(Lucas, 2015: cp. 2). The argument is based on the fact, that any diagnosing system is in its nature 
limited to looking at the potentially diagnosable individual and not its surroundings. Psychologist, 
Svend Brinkmann, puts forward this argument in his critique of our increased ‘tendency’ to 
diagnose people:
”For det tredje er et problem i patologiseringstendensen, at mange adfærdsformer, der 
klassificeres som sygelige af diagnosesystemerne, faktisk kan siges at være udtryk for 
adaptive strategier i forhold til bestemte miljøbetingelser.” (Brinkmann, 2010: 20)
Brinkmann goes on to quote an example from the book Making Us Crazy – DSM: The Psychiatric 
Bible and the Creation of Mental Disorders about a young girl, Alice, who has been diagnosed with 
oppositional defiant disorder. However, Alice comes from a chaotic home and her behavior could 
also be seen as a way to cope with her unfortunate circumstances:
”Modsat behandlingssystemets officielle diagnostiske fortolkning af Alices adfærd, så mener
forfatterne, at hun udviser en adaptiv – og ikke patologisk – respons på sit kaotiske miljø, 
men det er ikke desto mindre barnet og ikke familien, der diagnosticeres og dermed 
patologiseres af det sociale system, idet diagnosesystemet nødvendigvis opererer på 
individniveau.” (Brinkmann, 2010: 20)
This is a reasonable objection and it does in fact point towards a weakness in the diagnosing system.
By only looking at the individual’s symptoms it is quite possible to overlook social factors that may 
cause the behavior. Psychopathy does seem to have a genetic component but it is impossible to 
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point to a single gene that definitively determines the condition, and social factors do in fact play a 
role (Glen et al., 2015: 1691). However, even if we assume that the behavior is an attempt to adapt 
to certain exterior conditions – an abusive family for instance – it does not seem plausible that the 
type of conduct we are referring to could ever be described as a ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ response. 
While normal rebellious and defiant behavior could be solved by improving the child’s exterior 
circumstances, it would be naïve to assume that a child that has come so far as to display serious 
psychopathic traits would all of a sudden become empathetic, peaceful and sociable due to an 
exterior improvement alone. However, since there is a correlation between psychopathy and neglect
and abuse in the family (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013: 326), teachers should indeed be mindful of such 
potential problems. But one thing does not exclude the other. It is quite possible for a teacher to 
alert the authorities if she suspects abuse in the child’s home, and then still find a way to treat the 
child. So while it is definitely worthwhile to pay close attention to the child’s social circumstances it
does not seem sufficient in the case of a child showing psychopathic traits.
Pathologizing undesirable behavior
Lastly we would like to address the objection that says that diagnosing is society’s way of 
pathologizing undesirable behavior. The argument is based on the assumption that societies need to 
confirm their value system by labeling alternative ways of life as pathological and wrong by 
diagnosing them. There are indeed historical examples that clearly demonstrate such a tendency. 
The diagnosis drapetomania was invented in 1851 to describe the tendency in some North American
slaves to attempt to escape from their owners (Brinkmann, 2010: 275). The desire to escape is 
clearly not a pathological response to enslavement, but on the other hand, the fact that some 
diagnoses have been used for political purposes does not prove that diagnosing mental illness in 
general is a dubious activity. Svend Brinkmann quite firmly expresses such a critique:
”I det moderne samfund sker i disse år en omfattende patologisering af både vores psykiske 
og organiske liv. Vi ser således både en patologisering af uønsket adfærd (fx når urolige 
børn bliver til ADHD-patienter, eller når ondskab bliver til antisocial 
personlighedsforstyrrelse), af ubehagelige følelser (fx når generthed bliver til socialfobi, 
eller når tristhed bliver til depression) og af utilstrækkelige måder at tænke på (fx når 
ubegavethed bliver til indlæringsvanskeligheder). Det er tilsyneladende et væsentligt træk 
ved vores samfund, at alskens uønskede, ubehagelige og umoralske aspekter ved mennesket 
bliver patologiseret og ofte også diagnosticeret ved hjælp af de hastigt ekspanderende 
diagnostiske manualer.” (Brinkmann, 2010: 9).
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It is true, that the DSM manuals have been expanded drastically through the years and it is also true 
that there is an increase in the number people that are being diagnosed with some sort of mental 
illness or disorder (Ibid: 23). Whether or not this constitutes a problem is not the subject matter of 
this paper. As already mentioned, the diagnosis that we concern ourselves with here is not one that 
is easily obtained. Certain very specific and rather serious conditions must be met, and it does not 
seem likely that many children will be predicated with the diagnosis psychopath. Furthermore, it is 
clear that psychopaths actually lack a normal human ability to distinguish between conventional 
transgressions (defined as deviating from social norms) and moral transgressions (defined as 
violating others’ rights and welfare) (Marsh, 2014: 142). This is a distinction that three year olds as 
well as adults with Down’s syndrome are capable of making, so discarding the diagnosis as just 
being another word for ‘evil’, as Brinkmann seems to suggest, is an unjustifiably reductionist 
endeavor.
   In this chapter we have discussed some common objections to the idea of diagnosing mental 
illness in general and diagnosing children with mental illness in particular. We have examined the 
frequent argument about diagnoses becoming self-fulfilling prophecies, the argument that mental 
illness is an adaptive strategy to cope with external problems, and the argument that such diagnoses 
is a way for society to pathologize undesirable behavior. In all three cases we argue, that the 
arguments – though in some cases relevant – are not strong when it comes to the diagnosing of 
potential psychopathy in children.
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A moral responsibility to potential future 
victims
In this chapter we will focus on our moral responsibility to potential future victims of the 
psychopath's actions. In dealing with this issue we will take a closer look at the problem of false 
positives and neuropredictions in general. We will then look at an argument claiming that cognitive 
enhancement constitutes an unacceptable diminishing of individual worth, and see whether or not 
this argument should prohibit us from using morally enhancing neurotechnological interventions if 
they come about through cognitive enhancements.
Protecting the innocent
Most people will agree that the protection of future victims is a worthwhile pursuit. In the legal 
system, the risk of offenders reoffending is taken into account before parole or probation is granted. 
However, most people does also agree that there are limits to this pursuit. We are not willing to 
incarcerate all men in a given town to prevent an unknown sex offender from reoffending, even if 
this would protect future victims. As such, we are willing to do what is necessary to protect the 
innocent, only when the comparative cost of doing so is low enough. In order to justify preventive 
actions to protect possible future victims against individuals that have not offended yet, we have to 
show that the consequences of doing so is not comparatively worse than refraining from acting.
Neuropredictions and false positives
The accuracy of predictions, and the rate of false positives resulting from these predictions, is one 
of the key factors in determining whether or not to introduce preventive actions to protect future 
victims. There are some hard moral questions of how accurate a prediction has to be in order for it 
to be used in any legal setting: 
"Furthermore, even if one would hold that the predictions has reached a sufficient level of 
accuracy, say 75 %, is it then morally right to punish offenders more harshly if we know that
25 % of them will be false positives (i.e., offenders who are predicted to be dangerous, and 
therefore are punished more harshly, but who are in fact not dangerous at all)?" (Søbirk, 
2014: 138).
However, the question of what level of false positives we are willing to accept, should be influenced
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by the kind of intervention we are introducing. If we are talking about punishment and incarceration
it should be lower, but more benign interventions with less bad consequences for the individual 
should allow for a higher level, if the interventions can effectively reduce the number of future 
victims.
   There are good reasons to think that in the future neuropredictions can accurately help us identify 
future offenders. Even if there are challenges to the accuracy on individual risk assessment, there 
are good reasons to think that group data can provide valuable information on future offending. 
Group data is already used effectively in the cost assessment in the insurance industry, as well as in 
weather forecasting (Monahan, 2013: 65f). Evidence suggests that group data would be able to 
increase our accuracy when predicting the risk of future offending from specific groups. Part of the 
group that we are proposing to target, those that can be diagnosed with childhood-onset conduct 
disorder, are associated with a 50 percent rate of criminal behaviour and drug abuse in their 
adolescence. About 75 to 85 percent of them are chronically unemployed with a history of unstable 
relationships as adults, and between 35 and 40 percent of them end up diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder. It is in this same group, using the DSM-5 Criteria for Conduct Disorder, that 
we find those children which in addition to their conduct disorder, matches the criteria for limited 
prosocial emotions. This diagnosis includes the known traits for psychopathy such as a lack of 
remorse, guilt, empathy, and most importantly, an impaired ability to experience and recognize fear 
in others (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013: 321f).
   Several studies have shown that individual predictions of later antisocial and criminal behaviour is
possible. By using those that qualifies for the diagnosis for childhood-onset conduct disorder, while 
following them through their adolescence, we would be able to take preventive action against those 
that continue to show antisocial behavior or, by using biological factors, continue to be part of a risk
group. Such factors range from increased levels of testosterone at the ages 10-12, associated with 
violent behaviour later in adolescence to minor physical anomalies because of fetal neural 
maldevelopment measured at age 14 (Glen et al., 2015:1693). Brain scans using fMRI, targeting the
amygdala and anterior cingulate might help us predict which individuals will be able to respond to 
cognitive behavioral therapy, and as antisocial behavior does not seem to be hard-wired in the brain,
but is largely brought about by social factors activating certain genes(ibid: 1691), such findings 
might well enable us to help individuals avoid ending up with an antisocial disorder (ibid: 1694). 
   This suggests, that even if we have to accept a number of false positives in the process of 
identifying and neutralizing the dangers of individual psychopaths, these false positives, those that 
turn out not to be psychopaths but still matches the criteria of conduct disorder, might well end up 
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better off, insofar as we can help them to avoid becoming antisocial in their adulthood, which in 
turn will lower the number of future victims from the consequences of antisocial behaviour.
   One worry formulated by Greely, is that such neuropredictions might: "[...] reinforce existing 
stereotypes or create new ones. This in turn might foreclose opportunities for some individuals in 
the 'less talented on average' group, and might stigmatize the entire group." (Greely, 2006: 248). 
While reducing the number of future victims is a valuable goal to attain, stigmatization comes with 
very high costs for a great number of people, and in this case, especially the group of false 
positives. However, it is at best doubtful that using DSM-5 to identify groups with the risk of 
becoming psychopaths would increase stigmatization in any meaningful degree. These 'outgroups' 
expressing antisocial behaviour are already on the edge of society, and are continually judged by the
rest of society. While this is a very real problem, in that it makes it more likely that the individual 
will be cut off emotionally from society, or that he will turn to his peers and be reinforced in his 
antisocial behaviour, an effective program consisting of therapy and other effective 
neurotechnological treatments targeting the individual might well enable him to escape the 
stigmatized group later in his life. A diagnosis that explains why he has had a hard time fitting in, 
and the promise of help, might even bring about some amount of relief and hope.
Cognitive enhancement and diminished individual worth
Chang and Buccafurni's argument that cognitive enhancement constitutes a diminishing of 
individual worth was published as a response to a paper by Vedder and Klaming in which they 
argued for the use of human enhancement for the common good. In this paper, they focused on 
using neurotechnologies in order to improve eyewitness memory.
   However, Chang and Buccafurni's claim that cognitive enhancement diminishes individual worth 
is not limited as a response to the neurotechnological improvement of eyewitness memory, it makes 
a broader claim, namely that cognitive enhancement, as defined by Vedder and Klaming, in general 
constitutes this diminishing. Vedder and Klaming’s definition of what cognitive enhancement 
includes, seems to capture at least one realistic neurotechnological response to morally enhancing a 
psychopath, namely the enhancement of the psychopath's fear response. We will therefore take a 
closer look at this definition: "Cognitive functions comprise all processes involved in the 
organization of information, including perception, understanding, memory, and executive 
functions." (Vedder & Klaming, 2010: 23).
   Perception and understanding is closely linked to how any individual assess a situation. It is now 
well known, as it has been confirmed in studies through more than fifty years, that psychopaths 
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have an impaired ability to experience fear, and maybe as a result of this impairment, lacks the 
ability to recognize fear in others (Abigail, 2014: 147). This lack of fear has been linked to 
increased willingness to take risks, the failure of responding to the threat of future punishment and a
lack of empathic concern for others (Abigail, 2014: 148ff). Because of this, effectively stimulating 
and enhancing the psychopath’s ability to experience fear through neurotechnological means, might 
turn out to be one of the more effective ways to reduce the risk of future offending, and thereby 
reduce the number of future victims. As an alteration of the psychopath’s ability to experience fear 
will change his perception, and through that his understanding of a given situation, such a treatment
would qualify as a moral enhancement brought about by a cognitive enhancement, and is therefore 
subject to Chang and Buccafurni’s objection.
   If cognitive enhancements for the common good diminishes individual worth, then it would seem 
that such a treatment, even if it saves potential future victims from serious harm, should be regarded
as problematic. Chang and Buccafurni argues that such enhancements does in fact diminish 
individual worth:
"If cognitive capacity manipulation is accepted because it benefits the common good, this 
would mean that it is also accepted that individual good is worth sacrificing for the common
good. We define individual good not simply as the absence of physical or psychological pain
but as the presence of respect for cognitive capacities as an intrinsically valuable end in 
itself [...] In other words, accepting that the individual good is worth sacrificing for the 
common good violates the intrinsic value of the individual. As a result, the worth of the 
individual is diminished." (Chang & Buccafurni, 2010: 49).
The argument is deontological in its nature, and rejects the utilitarian focus on pleasure and pain by 
adding respect for cognitive capacities as an intrinsic value of the individual. However, the 
argument is not very convincing due to a number of reasons. (1) It is not clear why an enhancement 
made for the common good, but still benefiting the individual should be regarded as a lack of 
respect for cognitive capacities. Parents and schools are both in the business of enhancing these 
capacities. Both through education that enhances an individual’s ability to perceive and understand 
different problems, and through helping them to navigate in social situations. It is not clear that 
improvements that give the same benefits, such as an enhancement of the psychopath’s ability to 
experience fear and thereby enhancing his ability to interact, perceive and understand others, would 
be wrong just because it comes about an altering of cognitive capacities. And (2) it is not clear that 
the right not to be diminished is absolute. Surely there are situations where the rights of others, i.e. 
the life-changing harmful effects on future victims, trumps the individual’s right not to have his 
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worth diminished.
   Because of the instrumental violent nature of the psychopath, there are strong moral reasons in 
favor of introducing practices that lower the number of potential future victims. We have admitted 
that the problem of false positives in the criminal justice system exists in this area as well, but that it
is a smaller problem in this case because of the difference between the consequences in the criminal
justice system and in mandatory preventive treatment targeting people with antisocial disorders. As 
our ability to make neuropredictions becomes more accurate, it will be possible to minimize the 
level of false positives.
   We have critically discussed one kind of objection to mandatory treatment and argued that Chang 
and Buccafurni's claim that cognitive enhancements are diminishing individual worth is false, or 
that they at least will have to expand their argument in order to capture why the altering of cognitive
capacities differ morally in any meaningful way from the goals of parents and schools who are 
raising and educating children with the same goal as cognitive enhancements: to improve their 
perception and understanding of the world and those around them, and to give them better odds at 
living a good life as a part of society.
   Even if such cognitive enhancements does in fact diminish individual worth, we argue that the 
rights of future possible victims not to be harmed, outweigh the psychopath’s right not to have his 
individual worth diminished.
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Can mandatory treatment on possible future 
offenders ever be moral?
In this chapter we will discuss whether or not mandatory treatment on possible future offenders can 
ever be morally justified. We will start out by looking at Duff's claim that we have a right to be 
presumed harmless. As this is an argument against interventions without consent, we will discuss if 
and when this right can be overruled by other considerations. We will then critically discuss a strong
paternalistic argument in favor of mandatory treatment on possible future offenders. Because of the 
controversial nature of paternalism and its relation to autonomy, autonomy will be the subject of our
next chapter.
A right to be presumed harmless
In Dangerousness and Citizenship, the retributivist R. A. Duff formulated a: "'right to be presumed 
harmless' – 'to be presumed free of harmful intentions'." (Duff, 1998: 152). This right serves the 
purpose of protecting citizens from the criminal justice system by making it immoral to assume that
someone is criminally dangerous. However, we are not talking about an absolute right. The right 
can be forfeited under some special circumstances. In his paper, Duff is making a retributivist 
argument supporting the idea that we can give out special punishments or punish harder when an 
offender is dangerous and more likely to commit future crimes. To justify punishing some offenders
harder than others for the same crime, namely those that can be classified as responsible yet 
persistent, serious and violent offenders (Ibid: 141), he lays out a framework for when the right to 
be presumed harmless is forfeited:
"If someone persists in committing serious crimes, the presumption can be rebutted: not 
merely because we now have empirically sound evidence that he is not 'harmless' (that he 
might well commit further crimes); but because he has, by his own criminal conduct, 
undermined his right to that presumption. Given a suitably reliable prediction that he would 
probably commit further such crimes, if released after a normal term of imprisonment, we 
can therefore justifiably redistribute the costs of crime, or its prevention, onto him; we can 
impose on him the cost of being detained beyond the term of imprisonment he would 
otherwise serve for his current offence, rather than leaving other citizens to bear the costs of
his probable future crimes." (Ibid: 152)
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The key qualifier to lose one's right to be presumed harmless is to express a certain kind of 
behavior, namely a persistent behavior of committing serious crimes. While this right was 
formulated to protect adults from unjust punishment in the criminal justice system, we assume that 
the right to be presumed harmless also extends to minors. This raises some challenges for the 
position that it is morally permissible to use mandatory treatments on minors with conduct disorder 
because of their future dangerousness. If they have not yet committed the crimes that motivates us 
to intervene, the right to be presumed harmless entails that we cannot justify any intervention based 
on a possible future dangerousness.
   One might argue that the conditions for the right to be forfeited are too strict. Surely, if the group 
that person A is a member of, in this case those that can be diagnosed with conduct disorder and 
limited prosocial emotions, has a high rate of violent behaviour, then we are justified in concluding 
that there is a correspondingly high risk that person A, all else being equal, is dangerous. However, 
Duff argues that such actuarial predictions are problematic. Actuarial predictions cannot say that: 
"[...] this person is dangerous; only that there is a danger that he is dangerous." (Ibid: 154). Duff 
continues to argue that a person is dangerous if he (1) has traits or desires that can only be fulfilled 
by criminal conduct, such as the desire to force someone to have sex against their will, and (2) if 
such a character trait has been displayed in criminal conduct of the appropriate kind (Ibid: 154f). It 
comes down to: "Respect for autonomy, and the 'presumption of harmlessness' which follows from 
it" (Ibid: 155).
   While this makes a lot of intuitive sense when it comes to the criminal justice system and the 
threat of incarceration for crimes that may or may not end up being committed, it becomes more 
blurry when we are talking about early interventions on minors. First, we are proposing mandatory 
treatment and not incarceration. Secondly, we do not generally 'respect' the autonomy of minors in 
the sense that Duff is talking about, in fact we often override it for paternalistic reasons, and there 
seems to be good paternalistic reasons in this case to forfeit the right to be presumed harmless 
which we will discuss in a moment. And thirdly, in order to diagnose conduct disorder the 
individual has to display criminal character traits such as physical violence, burglary, destruction of 
property etc. (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013: 322). Because of this, an argument could be made that Duff's
criteria for displaying criminal character traits has been satisfied.
A paternalistic justification of mandatory treatment
As hinted above, there are good paternalistic reasons to implement mandatory treatment on minors. 
If we do nothing to help individuals that can be diagnosed with conduct disorder, a significant part 
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of them will grow up to develop antisocial traits. These traits are associated with severe problems 
with fitting into society and will, as we have discussed earlier, often lead to a bad life with unstable 
relationships and time in prison. Most people would agree that these are good things to help less 
fortunate individuals to avoid. We have good reasons to believe that the development of antisocial 
traits is something that can be prevented, and the earlier we act in the individual’s life, the more 
likely we are to succeed. This is due to the pliability of the young brain (Walsh, 2013: 51). This 
means that if we wait until the individual comes of age, our chance of successfully treating his 
condition becomes lower, and will likely require more invasive treatments. It is therefore 
recommendable that we begin treatment as early as possible. While most parents probably would 
like to do what is best for their child, we cannot necessarily expect parents from weak homes to 
support treatment that involves family counseling, individual talk therapy, pharmaceutical drugs or 
other interventions. We should expect at least some of them to be wary and mistrustful of any 
government interference in their family life. It should not be controversial to point out that not all 
parents are equally good at making decisions for their kids. Where mandatory treatment is 
necessary, it would protect children and their long-term interests especially when they come from 
these types of homes. In his 2005 paper on Joel Feinberg and hard paternalism, Arneson makes this 
exact point while talking about good choosers and bad choosers:
"On the whole and on the average, good choosers will tend to gain greater well-being in 
life, and bad choosers less. [...] Poor choosers can benefit from paternalism, and some 
could expect to benefit substantially from intelligent paternalist policy over the course of a 
lifetime. [...] There is then a distributive-justice aspect to the issue of paternalism. In 
embracing hard paternalism and enforcing sensible well-being-enhancing paternalistic 
rules, society will be enacting policies that are comparatively better for the bad choosers 
among its members than for the good choosers." (Arneson, 2005: 275).
If early treatment can be an effective tool in order to prevent the unfortunate individuals with 
conduct disorder to grow up and develop antisocial and psychopathic traits, mandatory treatment 
will at least in some cases be the only way of protecting the children of bad choosers. We generally 
accept that parents do not have the right to choose badly for their children if the consequences of 
doing so are sufficiently bad. One such example could be the case of a badly hurt child whose 
parents are members of Jehovas Witnesses. The child has lost a lot of blood, and will die if it does 
not get a blood transfusion. If the parents reject the offer, the state will temporarily take over 
custody of the child in order to ensure its survival and future well-being. Paternalist policy in our 
case can be defended on the same grounds if the treatment is (1) a low risk treatment for the child 
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compared to the consequences of doing nothing, and (2) an effective way to prevent the individual 
from ending up with antisocial or psychopathic traits.
   In this chapter we have critically discussed whether or not Duff's 'right to be presumed harmless' 
should extend to minors with conduct disorder and limited prosocial emotions. We argue that it 
should not because of a combination of the following factors: (1) We are advocating treatment and 
not incarceration, (2) the 'respect' for autonomy that Duff is referring to should not and is not 
normally extended to minors and, (3) because the behavior that is needed in order to diagnose 
someone with conduct disorder necessitates the display of criminal character traits.We argue that 
there is at least one strong paternalistic argument in favor of mandatory treatment when necessary 
in order to protect children from parents that are bad choosers, much in the same way as we do with
injured children in hospitals.
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Autonomy
In this chapter we give a general definition of autonomy in order to discuss the moral problems 
related to undermining the autonomy of parents who may refuse to let their children receive 
treatment – be it therapeutic or medicinal. We will discuss different criteria for when a decision is 
qualified to be called autonomous and discuss why seemingly autonomous decisions might 
sometimes be less autonomous due to cognitive bias. We will argue, that while autonomy is in fact 
valuable it is not an absolute value and it can be morally justifiable – or even required – to 
undermine parent’s autonomy under certain circumstances.
The meaning of autonomy
While most people will have an intuitive understanding of the meaning of the word autonomy, the 
term has historically been the subject of much technical discussion. One of the main problems of 
this discussion is related to the question of how autonomous an action needs to be in order to meet 
the necessary conditions to be called autonomous. In his book, The Theory and Practice of 
Autonomy, Gerald Dworkin addresses this problem and exemplifies it with several different views 
on the term. Without going into too much detail on the many historic and contemporary examples, it
is interesting to note that some definitions are definitely too strict to make any sense if we wish to 
speak of autonomy as something that actually exists. The famous behavioral psychologist, B. F. 
Skinner, actually denied the very existence of autonomy (Dworkin, 1988: 8). It would of course 
make no sense to discuss the moral questions concerning the infringement of autonomy, if we 
denied the existence of such a thing, but it goes to show how varied the opinions on the term are 
and how difficult it is to give a thorough definition. Dworkin recognizes this as he remarks:
“I use the vague term “characterize” rather than “define” or “analyze” because I do not 
think it possible with any moderately complex philosophical concept to specify necessary 
and sufficient conditions without draining the concept of the very complexity that enables it 
to perform its theoretical role.” (Ibid: 7).
If we by autonomous mean a person free of any sort of external influence then it is doubtful if any 
autonomous agents have ever existed. When we use the term in this paper, we refer to decisions 
made by reasonably rational agents, who are not under duress nor influenced by mind altering 
drugs. Whether or not their decision is based on the advice of another person or something they read
is not relevant as long as they freely – at least freely on a conscious level – choose to let that source 
influence their decision.
Cognitive bias and flawed reasoning
In her book, Against Autonomy, Sarah Conly argues that autonomy has historically been overvalued 
by most philosophers discussing the moral implications of coercive paternalism. This is partly due 
to what Conly refers to as cognitive bias. People are prone to miscalculate risks and probabilities 
and generally underestimate their own risk of falling victims of misfortunes even if it is entirely out 
of their hands to prevent it (Conly, 2010: 21f). One might intuitively think, that if your child is at 
great risk of facing problems later on in life, you would be willing to do almost anything to prevent 
this from happening. Some parents certainly would. But it is also a sensitive subject, and people 
have a tendency to want to protect their children from too much interference. There is also a risk of 
misjudgement due to natural love parents feel for their own children. It is often harder to judge 
correctly about those closest to us, and many parents would feel inclined to come up with excuses 
for their children’s behavior. Furthermore, we often have conflicting desires. It may be logically 
inconsistent to autonomously not want to let a therapist near your child who suffers from conduct 
disorder and limited prosocial emotions while simultaneously wanting your child to live a good life 
without getting into trouble with the criminal justice system. But there is nothing that prevents 
people from being logically inconsistent at times. Even if you want what is best for your child more 
than you want to be free from therapeutic interference, the immediate presence of the unwanted 
interference in one’s personal life combined with the uncertainty and potential nature of your child’s
future legal trouble, might well induce some parents to reject the offer. In such a case coercive 
paternalism would actually help people get what they autonomously want the most, but because of 
flawed reasoning and cognitive bias are unable to pursue . As Conly puts it: “Coercive paternalism 
takes certain decisions out of our hands. It does this in order to help us do what we want to do (…)”
(Conly, 2010: 33). 
   It could also be argued in this case, that a child who meets these conditions are likely to end up in 
a situation, where his or her autonomy will be severely limited if no early help is provided. So a 
minor reduction of parental autonomy might well lead to a much more autonomous life for the child
in the future, because it is less likely to end up in prison and more likely to have meaningful and 
stable relationships with other people (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2013: 321).
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The value of autonomy
While there is hardly any question as to whether or not autonomy is in some way valuable, 
philosophers disagree as to how much and in what way. Joel Feinberg considers autonomy to be an 
absolute value and considers governmental infringements of autonomy to be highly blamable:
“Part of the answer, I think, is that when it is applied by another party to oneself it seems 
arrogant and demeaning. It says in effect that there are sharp limits to my right to govern 
myself even within the wholly self-regarding sphere, that others may intervene even against 
my protests to “correct” my choices and then (worst of all) justify their interference on the 
ground (how patronizing!) that they know my own good better than I know myself.” 
(Feinberg, 1986: 23)
Others, like Conly, have the more moderate view that while autonomy is valuable, its value is 
instrumental rather than intrinsic, and that the question of whether or not paternalistic interference is
permissible should be a question of costs and benefits:
“In all these theories, a natural division between permissible and impermissible paternalism
is hard to find – because, I will argue, no division exists other than that provided by a cost-
benefit analysis. What makes paternalism permissible is not a function of the intrinsic 
features of the situations as much as how much some interventions costs us, both in terms of 
psychological burden and social ones” (Conly, 2010: 7).
We tend to agree with Conly on this subject. Considering things such as cognitive bias, conflicting 
desires and the fleeting nature of the very concept of autonomy, it seems unreasonable to claim that 
autonomy is a priori off limits. As we have discussed, there is considerable harm associated with the
violent crimes of psychopaths. They are severely overrepresented in crime statistics and the nature 
of their crimes tend to be characterized by instrumental violence (Maibom, 2015: 10). When 
considering this issue through Conly’s method of analyzing costs and benefits, it seems that in this 
case the costs of not intervening are very high: (1) Several innocents could end up severely hurt or 
murdered and as a result experience a loss of autonomy, and (2) a person that might have been able 
to live a productive and meaningful life may have to spend many years in prison, and will as a result
lose the right to make many autonomous decisions during his incarceration, probation and parole. 
The cost of intervening seems low in comparison: A parent suffers an undermining of his or her 
autonomy regarding a parental decision that seems dubious in the first place. While autonomy is - 
as previously mentioned - valuable, every situation should be evaluated independently, and in this 
case we would argue that the autonomy of parents should be overruled in favor of the concern for 
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the potential future victims, the child itself, and the loss of autonomy that both parties would suffer 
if the child grows up to develop an antisocial disorder such as psychopathy and commits a violent 
crime.
   In this chapter we have discussed the problems concerning the finer nuances regarding the 
concept of autonomy, and given a rough definition of the minimum conditions that we consider 
sufficient for a decision to be autonomous. Furthermore, we have introduced various factors that 
might interfere with the ability to make rational decisions such as cognitive bias and flawed 
reasoning. We have looked at two different views on how to value autonomy, and we conclude that 
it is morally permissible to override autonomy if the cost of not doing so is comparatively higher.
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Conclusion
In our chapter on surveillance and privacy we conclude that the kind of surveillance that we propose
is not significantly different from the surveillance that children are already exposed to, and that it is 
morally justifiable especially because of the greater chance of success if antisocial behavior is 
recognized and treated early in life.
   In our chapter on diagnosing we conclude that the objections are not sufficiently relevant to 
render the practice that we propose unethical when it comes to the diagnosing of children with 
conduct disorder and limited prosocial emotions.
   In the chapter focusing on our moral responsibility to potential future victims we conclude that 
the problem of false positives should not prohibit us from introducing mandatory treatments 
because of the low cost and potential advantages that the treatments might bring them. We conclude
that the claim that cognitive enhancements are an unacceptable diminishing of individual worth 
fails to demonstrate its validity.
   In our chapter on whether or not it can ever be morally right to introduce mandatory treatments on
potential future offenders, we conclude that ‘the right to be presumed harmless’ can be forfeited if 
the target group is minors with conduct disorder. We then conclude that the protection of children of
parents that are ‘bad choosers’ is a strong paternalist argument in favor of mandatory treatment.
   In the last chapter on autonomy we conclude that autonomy has instrumental and not intrinsic 
value, and that it is morally permissible to infringe upon parents autonomy if the costs of not doing 
so are comparatively higher.
In the end we conclude that the above mentioned objections to mandatory treatment of minors with 
conduct disorder and limited prosocial emotions fail to give a reasonable account of why the 
practice is unethical, and that the positive benefits are sufficiently great to make the practice 
morally permissible.
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